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Incommensurability and laboratory science∗
Emiliano Trizio
Universities of Paris-X Nanterre et Venezia Ca’ Foscari
Résumé : Le but de l’article est d’établir des relations entre, d’une part, la
caractérisation générale kuhnienne de l’incommensurabilité comme impossibi-
lité de traduire l’une dans l’autre les taxinomies de théories scientifiques rivales
et, d’autre part, la version plus spécifique de l’incommensurabilité proposée par
Hacking, laquelle porte sur des théories concurrentes s’étant stabilisées en re-
lation à des équipements de laboratoire et des techniques de mesure différents.
Sur la base d’une analyse, inspirée des travaux de Duhem, de la nature des
taxinomies scientifiques, on soutiendra que l’approche linguistique kuhnienne
est inadéquate pour rendre compte de la manière dont les termes scientifiques
s’appliquent à la nature dans le domaine des sciences de laboratoire, au sein
desquelles le rôle des opérations de mesure est essentiel. L’analyse introduira
la notion de taxinomie duale et celle de caractère ostensif d’une théorie. Il
apparaîtra que, une fois ces deux notions prises en compte, il devient possible
de poser les bases d’une version taxinomique élargie de l’incommensurabilité,
susceptible de fournir un cadre commun pour la discussion des exemples in-
troduits par Kuhn et Hacking.
Abstract: The aim of the article is to establish relations between Kuhn’s
general characterization of incommensurability as the impossibility to trans-
late the taxonomies pertaining to rival scientific theories into one another
∗I wish to express my deep gratitude to Léna Soler, whose many comments and
suggestions have compelled me to rethink various aspects of this article and to modify
it in a substantial way. It is also a pleasure to thank Matteo Bevilacqua, Emiliano
Boccardi, Fantina Madricardo, Ayesha Mian, Anna Sartori and the anonymous ref-
erees of Philosophia Scientiæ for helping me to improve its form and content.
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and Hacking’s more specific version of incommensurability affecting compet-
ing theories that have stabilized relatively to different laboratory equipments
and measurement techniques. On the basis of an analysis of the nature of sci-
entific taxonomies that takes its inspiration from the works of Duhem, it will
be argued that Kuhn’s language-based approach is inadequate to provide an
account of the way scientific terms apply to nature in the domain of physical
laboratory science, in which the role of measurement procedures is essential.
The analysis will be carried out by introducing the notion of dual taxonomy
and the notion of ostensive character of a theory. It will result that, once these
two notions are taken into account, it becomes possible to lay the foundations
of an enlarged taxonomic version of incommensurability which can provide a
common framework for the discussion of the examples introduced by Kuhn
and Hacking.
1. Introduction: Kuhn’s linguistic version and Hack-
ing’s “literal” version of incommensurability
It is well known that Kuhn has increasingly stressed over the years the
role of language, meaning and translation in his account of revolutionary
changes and incommensurability1. He has also explained that this evolu-
tion was coherent with the problems that originally motivated the intro-
duction of this notion: namely those faced by the historian when trying
to interpret old scientific texts, which, to a modern reader, seem often
more obscure and nonsensical than simply wrong or outdated. Kuhn
came to believe that this interpretative work requires, in a non-trivial
sense, the understanding of the language in which those texts were writ-
ten [Kuhn 1983a, 56-57]2 for, “the appearance of nonsense could be re-
moved by recovering older meanings for some of the terms involved,
meanings different from those subsequently current” [Kuhn 1990c, 91].
Following this line of reasoning, he compared the task of the historian
with that of the linguist and became deeply interested in the works of
Quine on meaning and translation [Kuhn 1970b, 165].
It must be stressed that although (contrary to Hacking3) Kuhn deems
the theory of meaning necessary to any satisfactory account of scientific
knowledge [Kuhn 1993, 229], he restricts its role in the discussion of in-
commensurability to the treatment of “taxonomic terms” or “kind terms”
1On the evolution of the concept of incommensurability in Kuhn’s writings after
its introduction in 1962 see [Hoyningen-Huene 1989, 206-222] (the pages mentionned
are the ones of the english edition).
2For all the papers contained in [Kuhn 2000], the pages mentionned are the ones
of this last book.
3See, for instance, [Hacking 1983, 43-45].
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[Kuhn 1990c, 92]. Different theories have a different lexical taxonomy,
(which Kuhn calls also lexicon [Kuhn 1990c, 93]). When translation be-
tween such lexical taxonomies is (at least partially) impossible, the two
theories are said to be incommensurable: there is no common measure
in the sense that “there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which
both theories, conceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without
residue or loss” [Kuhn 1983a, 36].
Kuhn’s linguistic-taxonomic account of incommensurability is far from
being the only one. Since its introduction in 1962, the concept of incom-
mensurability has given rise to several attempts to grasp the main idea
underlying the purported “lack of common measure” that the word by
itself suggests. Kuhn’s departure from a literal interpretation of the
concept, as we have seen, comes along with his stress on language and
translatability (incommensurability = no common language). Hacking
and Pickering have instead maintained that incommensurability can also
be interpreted in a non-metaphorical way, when the essential role played
by measurement instruments and procedures in laboratory science are
taken into consideration. While Kuhn, as it will repeatedly be stressed,
develops a highly general account of incommensurability, which applies
to common sense language as well as to scientific theories of any degree of
complexity, Hacking and Pickering have devoted special attention to the
relation between rival theories whose development is deeply intertwined
with the stabilization of different and incompatible laboratory practices
and equipments.
According to Hacking, “Stable laboratory science arises when theo-
ries and laboratory equipment evolve in such a way that they match
each other and are mutually self-vindicating” [Hacking 1992, 56]. As
self-vindication does not exclude the possibility that more refined instru-
ments produce new sets of data incompatible with the available theories,
laboratory sciences can undergo deep crises that call for the development
of new theories. This development takes place as a complex, mutual
maturation of theory and experiment leading to a new stabilized stage
of laboratory science. Yet the old theory is still compatible with the old
sets of instruments and data. This fact is essential to Hacking’s views
on incommensurability.
Kuhn (1961) noticed almost all of this with characteristic precision. Fetishis-
tic measurement sometimes hints at anomaly that can only be tackled by
devising new categories of instruments that generate new data that can be
interpreted only by new sort of theory: not puzzle solving but revolution.
This is the overriding theme of his study of black-body radiation (Kuhn
1978). He omitted only the fact that the old theory and its instruments
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remain pretty much in place, in their data domain. Hence new and old the-
ory are incommensurable in an entirely straightforward sense. They have
no common measure because the instruments providing the measurements
for the one are inapt for the other. This is a scientific fact that has nothing
to do with “meaning change” and other semantic notions that have been
associated with incommensurability. [Hacking 1983, 43-45]4 .
Hacking distinguishes this kind of incommensurability from the one that
concerns the translation between kind terms that he discusses in another
article [Hacking 1993, 275-310]. His two separate treatments have a lot
in common, for they are both based on Hacking’s fundamental unwill-
ingness to interpret science (and knowledge in general) solely in terms
of notions such as language and meaning at the expenses of its practical
and material dimension.
Although I would not subscribe to the view that a theory of mean-
ing is altogether unnecessary in the philosophy of science, the general
point of view that I will adopt in this article is close to that of Hack-
ing. The fact that theories can be considered up to a certain extent as
sets of sentences or, at any rate, as abstract meaning structures, has
led many philosophers (in primis the logical empiricists) to neglect the
crucial role played by practice and manipulation in science. Science was
thus reduced to the pair language/observation and little effort was made
to analyse in detail what the notion “observation” really amounts to in
science and what goes with it. As it is well known, Kuhn, along with
others, has contributed to the overthrow of logical empiricism, precisely
by blurring the distinction theory/observation; but, I will argue, he has
done it in such a way that language has been granted a role, which is,
if possible, even more prominent than it used to be. Kuhn’s analyses
do not focus on the different status of the operations that allow differ-
ent types of scientific theories and taxonomies to apply to the world.
His study of exemplars, which I will discuss later in some detail, under-
writes this interpretation. I will try to give an account of “how scientific
terms attach to nature” that takes into consideration these differences,
with special attention to the distinction between observation and mea-
surement. The aim of this analysis will be to show that the two kinds
of incommensurability just referred to can be accommodated in an en-
larged taxonomic version, which takes into account the distinctive roles
of observation, experimental practices and measurement procedures.
One terminological clarification concerning the meaning of the term
“taxonomy” is indeed necessary. In Kuhn’s works terms like “vocabulary”,
4See also [Pickering 1984, 407-414], and [Pickering 1995, 186-192].
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“structured vocabulary” [Kuhn 1989, 61], “conceptual vocabulary” [Kuhn
1991, 220], “lexicon”, “lexical taxonomy”, “cluster of terms” [Kuhn 1989,
65] are employed more or less as synonyms. One has the impression
that he tends to prefer “taxonomy” or “lexical taxonomy” when he refers
to theories (like ancient astronomy) whose concepts can be ordered in
“trees” on the basis of the relation between genera et species [Kuhn
1991, 218], while he is more inclined to speak simply of “lexicon” or
“cluster of terms” when he discusses the conceptual structures of physico-
mathematical theories such as Newtonian mechanics [Kuhn 1989, 65-66].
Yet it seems to me that he intends to analyse a theory’s conceptual
vocabulary without presupposing that its structure is that of a classical
“aristotelian” taxonomy. Hacking, on the contrary, discusses kuhnian
incommensurability on the basis of a precise definition of “conceptual
taxonomy” in terms of the relation genus/species and of the existence of
a summum genus or category at the top of the tree [Hacking 1993, 286],
[Hacking 2003].
In what follows, I will use the word “taxonomy” in what I take to
be Kuhn’s loose sense, without assuming that the conditions defining
tree-like taxonomies are always fulfilled and I will employ the aforemen-
tioned companion expressions more or less according to the kuhnian
usage. This choice is justified by the fact that many of Kuhn’s analyses
concern conceptual clusters whose structure cannot be reduced to that
of a taxonomic tree5. In general, we can say that the problem of char-
acterizing the nature of revolutionary scientific development demands
that an account of scientific conceptualization be given, and the tree-like
taxonomic pattern based on the genus/species relation does not seem to
be apt to accommodate the huge variety of conceptual structures that
we encounter in science. This becomes more apparent when physico-
mathematical theories6 are taken into account7.
The plan of the article is the following:
• in section 2 a comparison developed by Nancy Cartwright between
Kuhn’s and Duhem’s accounts of the relation between theory and
observation will be discussed. It will result that a discussion of the
5Sometimes what Kuhn calls a “lexicon” even includes laws of nature and conse-
quently cannot be thought of as a mere structured set of kind terms, “Once mass
and the second law have been added to the Newtonian lexicon in this way, the law
of gravity can be introduced as an empirical regularity” [Kuhn 1989, 70] (emphasis
added). I will avoid this admittedly deviant usage.
6Throughout the article I will refer to physico-mathematical theories, terms or
taxonomies as those specifically pertaining to modern mathematized physics.
7As it was shown already by [Cassirer 1910], especially chapters I and IV.
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way scientific terms attach to nature requires, in the case of math-
ematical physics, a careful analysis of laboratory practices. Such
an analysis appears to be missing in Kuhn’s writings, which focus
mainly on the use of scientific language in teaching, learning and
theorizing, without an acknowledgement of the ultimately essential
role of experiments.
• In section 3 some of Duhem’s penetrating insights on the subject
are recalled and,
• in section 4, they are taken as the starting point for a characteri-
zation of the nature of conceptualization in laboratory science. It
is claimed that what Duhem’s analysis shows is that physical ide-
alizations differ from everyday observational concepts not so much
because they are more general and abstract, but because, in or-
der to apply them to the world, one must simultaneously yield
a theoretical interpretation of whatever contributes to define the
experimental context that renders their application possible. Tax-
onomies belonging to mathematical physics will thus be described
as dual, in the sense that they subsume natural entities and pro-
cesses only if they co-subsume practical contexts and laboratory
items.
• These results will be used in section 5 to criticize Kuhn’s language-
centred account of the way scientific terms attach to nature. It
will be argued that his language-relative developmental character-
ization of the theory/observation distinction is unable to capture
the essential difference existing between taxonomies that can be
applied perceptually and taxonomies that require acts of measure-
ments (and that are therefore dual).
• In section 6 Kuhn’s failure to recognize the importance and speci-
ficity of laboratory practices will be shown to be a consequence
of the fact that his analysis conflates learning and understanding
scientific terms with their authentic application to nature.
• The notion of dual taxonomy will be further clarified and illus-
trated with the aid of an example in section 7.
• In section 8 the application of scientific theories outside the lab-
oratory will be briefly discussed. For this purpose the notion of
ostensive character of a theory will be introduced. Theories can
be classified according to the degree of perceptual accessibility of
the objects and processes they are about (the ostensive character).
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Much of contemporary laboratory science corresponds to a stage
at which theories have very weak or no ostensive character at all
and whose taxonomies can be applied to the world only via the
mediation of measurement instruments.
• Finally, in section 9, on the grounds of the preceding analyses, the
main ideas for an enlarged taxonomic version of incommensurabil-
ity will be introduced.
2. Cartwright on Duhem and Kuhn
Nancy Cartwright has drawn attention on some essential features com-
mon to Duhem’s and Kuhn’s accounts of the relation between theory
and observation. Her starting point is that observation is theory-laden
and that Kuhn has helped us to see it. Nevertheless, she goes on, “(. . . )
to admit that observation is theory-laden is a long way from denying
that there is a theory/observation distinction”. She rightly points out
that terms used by scientists can be and often are more recondite than
those used in every-day life. Disagreement begins as soon as one wonders
how the dividing line has to be drawn. Cartwright quotes a long passage
taken from section 3 of the Postscript of The Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions to the effect that Kuhn too sees a gap between the abstract and
symbolic generalizations of physical theory and the concrete situations
to which they apply. I will start my analysis from that passage just as
Cartwright does.
The central notion of the passage is that of paradigm as shared ex-
ample8. To illustrate it Kuhn considers Newton’s second principle (or
law) of dynamics f = ma. According to him the meaning and cognitive
content of the principle is not located at a purely theoretical level. The
kuhnian classical move to understand the real cognitive content (and, as
we shall see, not an innocent one) is to resort to an analysis of the way
the members of the community have learned to apply the expression to
some paradigmatic concrete situations. According to Kuhn f = ma is,
rather than a simple law, a law-sketch or a law-schema. Students learn
how to use different versions of it by being exposed to paradigmatic cases
of classical dynamical systems such as a free falling body, a simple pen-
dulum, a pair of harmonic oscillators, etc. In each case they are taught
8It is worth recalling that this notion constitutes the fourth components of the
disciplinary matrix, which in turn represents what the members of a scientific com-
munity share during a period of normal science (see [Kuhn 1970a, 181-187]).
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how to recognize masses, forces and accelerations and how to pick up
the suitable variants of Newton’s law. Kuhn concludes:
The resultant ability to see a variety of situations as like each other, as
subject for f = ma or some other symbolic generalisation, is, I think, the
main thing a student acquires by doing exemplary problems, whether with
pencil and paper or in a well-designed laboratory9.
That is, Kuhn can say, “At the start and for some time after, doing
problems is learning consequential things about nature”. There is no
real understanding of a symbolic generalization without simultaneous
acquaintance with particular examples that is without a given interpre-
tation of some phenomenal situations.
According to Cartwright, Duhem’s analysis has a lot in common with
that of Kuhn. I will now sketch her views on the subject and sub-
sequently argue that there is actually a crucial difference between the
accounts of the two historians and philosophers of science. Such differ-
ence will in turn result highly interesting in the discussion of Kuhn’s
views about incommensurability.
It is well known that Duhem draws a sharp line between the language
of common sense and the language of theory. A common sense gener-
alization such as “all men are mortal” is postulated inductively on the
grounds of direct observations of facts accessible in everyday life. This
is the case because terms such as “man” and “mortal” apply directly to
particular cases. Everyday concepts are abstract and general but they
can be, according to Duhem, attached unproblematically to individual
objects in the real world. A law of physics is, on the contrary, an abstract
and symbolic generalization, whose terms cannot be applied directly to
individual objects: we cannot see temperature instantiated in a concrete
object, just as we see its shape or colour. In order to judge that an ob-
ject has a certain temperature we must resort to an act of measurement.
It is measurement, as Duhem famously said, that makes possible the
translation10 between the abstract and symbolic expressions of physical
theory and the concrete circumstances that also the “layman ignorant of
physics” would witness while an experiment is being performed.
9[Kuhn 1970a, 189], emphasis added. The fact that Kuhn considers irrelevant
whether a concept is acquired “with pencil and paper or in a well-designed laboratory”
will play an important role in the next sections.
10It order to avoid confusion, it must be stressed that Duhem uses the term “trans-
lation” somehow metaphorically, and not in the more technical sense implied by Kuhn
while discussing the notion of incommensurability.
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According to Cartwright, Duhem’s and Kuhn’s claims can be both
accounted for by pointing out that the relation between a symbolic ex-
pression and the different cases to which it applies is that of the abstract
to the concrete. Just like the abstract moral of a fable is expressed and
made intelligible thanks to the description of a concrete situation, an
abstract generalization such as f = ma needs more concrete models in
order to be understood by students and practitioners of physics. Clearly,
there are many different possible models embodying concrete situations
that fall under a single abstract description.
The question that should be now asked, I believe, is just: how con-
crete are the models Cartwright (and Kuhn) refers to? Certainly, not as
concrete as Duhem’s common sense facts and descriptions. The following
example is sufficient to show this:
I maintain that to say of mass m that it is distance r from another mass M
is a concrete description to which corresponds the familiar more abstract
description “Mass m is subject to a force of size GmM/r2”. [Cartwright
1993, 268].
What is considered concrete in this case is actually expressed in math-
ematical terms and involves a physical concept such as that of mass.
Clearly then, the models that render abstract and symbolic general-
izations intelligible can still be quite apart from the world of everyday
experience. Cartwright is fully aware of this:
Of course, the more concrete descriptions may themselves be abstract when
compared to yet another level of discourse in terms of which they can be
more concretely fitted out in turn. (. . . ) Models are a long way from the
world. [Cartwright 1993, 270].
How then is the actual connection with the world eventually obtained
in the case of mathematical physics? How do models relate to reality?
That can happen only when an experiment is performed11. The prob-
lem of the relationship between the recondite concepts of physical theory
and those of everyday experience cannot therefore be resolved simply by
distinguishing physical theory from models. A schematic account based
on at least three stages must be developed, where the final link with
the world is realized by means of experimental practices. Cartwright
(who also pays attention to this third experimental level) has excessively
stressed, I believe, the analogy between Duhem’s and Kuhn’s views on
11There are indeed other highly theoretical sciences whose hypotheses are not re-
lated to the world only with the aid of experiments.
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the subject. In the following section I will briefly recall some of Duhem’s
interesting insights on the relation between theory and experiment. Sub-
sequently, I will try to show, on the grounds of a qualified “duhemian”
position, that Kuhn has never really put this relation properly into focus
when dealing with the problem of how scientific terms attach to nature.
3. Back to Duhem
The problem of relating the symbolic language of physics to nature can
be rephrased, borrowing from Duhem, in terms of the possibility to trans-
late theoretical facts into practical facts and vice versa. It is true that
Duhem draws a distinction between common sense observation and phys-
ical experiment; but let us not lose sight of the fact that he also attributes
to the results of the experiments belonging to descriptive sciences such
as physiology or botany the status of mere reports of concrete facts that
need no interpretation in theoretical terms12. The peculiar character of
the experiments performed in physics (and up to a certain extent, in
chemistry) is due to their being aimed at applying mathematical lan-
guage to nature. A theoretical fact is for Duhem, an idealized system
fully defined in terms of physical properties, which are in turn expressed
in exact mathematical terms, whereas a practical fact is what corre-
12Duhem’s insistence that only physico-mathematical language is responsible for
the theory-ladenness of observation is, as it will result clear in the following sections,
one of the aspects of his thought that can no longer be accepted. Some of Duhem’s
statements about common sense knowledge sound to today’s readers, to say the least,
baﬄing, “The laws that ordinary non-scientific experience allows us to formulate are
general judgements whose meaning is immediate. In the presence of one of these
judgments we may ask, ‘Is it true?’ Often the answer is easy; in any case the an-
swer is a definite yes or no. The law recognized as true is so for all time and for
all men; it is fixed and absolute.” [Duhem 1991, 178] (the pages mentionned are
the ones of the english edition). The great critic of inductive method doesn’t even
question the absolute validity of general common sense judgements, besides that of
particular ones! Theories, however, do not exist, according to Duhem, only within
mathematical physics, although the term “theoretical fact” is forged by him specif-
ically for the latter. Also physiologists develop theories, but the experiments they
perform are not infected by them and rest on the direct observation of “a recital of
concrete and obvious facts” [Duhem 1991, 147], whose status is very much alike to
that of common sense experience, “When many philosophers talk about experimental
sciences, they think only of sciences still close to their origins, e.g., physiology or
certain branches of chemistry where the experimenter reasons directly on the facts
by a method which is only common sense brought to greater attentiveness but where
mathematical theory has not yet introduced its symbolic representations.” [Duhem
1991, 180]. Experiments pertaining to those sciences “still close to the origin” involve
theoretical presuppositions only when (again) physical instruments are used [Duhem
1991, 183], but clearly this is an exogenous source of theory-ladenness.
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sponds to it in the real world, which lies before our eyes, the world in
which there is no perfect geometrical shape, no point-like particle, no
physical magnitude defined at each instant and at each point and, most
of all, no exactly quantifiable property; in short, the world accessible to
our senses and describable without any knowledge of physics13.
It is tempting to think that Duhem is trying to relate objects, as they
are directly perceived, with the physico-mathematical modelizations that
replace them in the calculation of the theoretician. The layman sees a
block of ice (the practical fact), while the physicist “sees” a thermody-
namic system subject to certain pressure etc. (the theoretical fact). The
famous title of the section opening the chapter of La Théorie Physique
in which Duhem analyses the role of experiments in physics, seems to
underwrite this interpretation: “An Experiment in Physics Is not Sim-
ply the Observation of a Phenomenon; It Is, Besides, the Theoretical
Interpretation of This Phenomenon” [Duhem 1991, 144]. The title sug-
gests that on one side there are the phenomena, the practical facts (i.e.
nature) as they are directly observed, while on the other side there is
their interpretation in the language of physical theory. Nevertheless, the
examples described in the section show that the real state of affairs is
more complicated. It is worth quoting at length the description of one
of them:
Regnault is studying the compressibility of gases; he takes a certain quan-
tity of gas, encloses it in a glass tube, keeps the temperature constant, and
measures the pressure the gas supports and the volume it occupies.
There you have, it will be said, the minute and exact observation of certain
phenomena and certain facts. Certainly, in the hands and under the eyes
of Regnault, (. . . ) concrete facts were produced ; was the recording of these
facts that Regnault reported his intended contribution to the advancement
of physics? No. In a sighting device Regnault saw the image of a certain
13Duhem’s theoretical facts are very much at the same level of Cartwright’s models
and Kuhn’s text-book problems: they are expressed in the language of physics, but
they are not as general and abstract as either physical theories or physical laws. They
differ from models or exercises in that the latter consist of the description of a whole
physical situation, whereas the expression “theoretical fact” can be used also to refer
just to a part or a single aspect of it, or to temporal stages of its evolution. An
oscillating circuit with given characteristics can be the object of textbook exercises
and can be a model that helps us to relate electromagnetic theory to the world. A
theoretical fact, on the other hand, can consist of a description of the kind “there
is here an oscillating circuit of such and such characteristics”, but it can be also
“there is an electrical current of three ampere” and even “the current is on”. Finally,
theoretical facts must be distinguished from laws and generalizations that Duhem
sees as complex summaries of theoretical facts and that, in turn, are classified and
summarized by physical theories [Duhem 1991, 22-23].
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surface of mercury become level with a certain line; is that what he recorded
in the report of his experiment? No, he recorded that a gas occupied a
volume having such and such a value. An assistant raised and lowered
the lens of a cathetometer until the image of another height of mercury
became level with the hairline of the lens; he then observed the disposition
of certain lines on the scale and on the vernier of the cathetometer; is that
what we find in Regnault’s memoir? No, we read there that the pressure
supported by the gas had such and such a value. (. . . ) [Those values are]
abstract symbols which only physical theory connects to the facts really
observed. [Duhem 1991, 145-146].
As this passage clearly shows, what the concrete facts really observed
amount to is the history of the experimental setting while the experiment
is been performed, as it would appear to a layman ignorant of physics.
This history is not only that of the objects under investigation, the frag-
ments of external reality the experimenter strives to describe in physical
terms (in this case, the gas enclosed in a glass tube); it is also that of
the actions, instruments and tools that have been deployed in order to
bring about the required conditions (Duhem says: “concrete facts were
produced”) and to carry out the relevant measurement procedures. It is
this “the recital of concrete facts” that must be interpreted with the aid
of physical theory, not a chunk of the ready-made phenomenal world, for
clearly, a thermometer and its use have nothing do to, by themselves,
with the sample of gas. This recital is translated in the report, which in
turn provides the basis for stating the results of the experiment. Both the
report and the results are stated in an abstract and symbolic language.
Duhem’s analysis of the nature of this reformulation in theoretical
terms can be schematized in the following way:
1. The sentences in common sense language describing the facts really
observed must be replaced by abstract and symbolic judgements.
This, in turn, implies that:
– the instruments used must be mentally substituted by ide-
alizations endowed with physical properties known in an ap-
proximate way14.
– the actual spatio-temporal region in which the phenomenon
under investigation occurs must be replaced in the mind of
14It is while discussing the role of instruments in laboratories that Duhem in-
troduces the important notion of type schématique d’instrument (see original ver-
sion, [Duhem 1906, 235], unfortunately translated into English as “schematic model”
[Duhem 1991, 156], thus somehow hiding the possible link with the classificatory
nature of physical concepts and laboratory activities (see next section).
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the experimenter by a physical system fully defined by all
physical properties that, as far as it is known, may turn out
to affect in some way the result.
2. The data obtained must be analysed according to the theoretical
interpretation of the experiment in order to formulate the abstract
and symbolic judgement constituting the result of the experiment.
The theoretical replacement concerning the laboratory as a spatiotemporal
region implies, we could say, that the entire world is omitted from the
theoretical interpretation of a phenomenon, except for what our theo-
ries assert to be relevant, once a certain degree of approximation in the
physical description has been set as a target.
Having briefly recalled Duhem’s reconstruction of the interpretative
moment of an experiment, we can now try to see whether it helps us to
better appreciate the nature of the relation between theoretical facts and
practical facts and, consequently, that of physical theory to the world.
4. Conceptualization in laboratory science: the dual
taxonomy
As we have seen, Duhem refers to this relation as a translation. How-
ever his own account invites us to describe it as one of conceptualization
or subsumption: physical theory provides a network of concepts that
through experimental practices are applied to the world. Talk of con-
cepts and their application will help us to highlight the role of practice
in laboratory science and its relevance for the doctrine of incommensu-
rability.
What is essential to this analysis is that it shows us how to recog-
nize the peculiar character of the conceptualization provided by physical
theory vis-à-vis the ordinary application of observational concepts. Con-
cepts of any kind serve the purpose of grouping individuals into classes.
They provide a taxonomy of things, events and processes that renders
the world intelligible to us. Although it would seem natural to think
that physical knowledge develops on the grounds of commonsensical,
pre-existing taxonomies, by correcting and refining them in virtue of a
rich and highly sophisticated network of concepts which, so to speak, su-
perimposes on the previous one, the preceding analysis shows that this
is not exactly the case. I refer here to the fact that physical concepts
attach to nature only if a whole experimental context is theoretically
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interpreted. Let us see why this fact makes physical concepts and de-
scriptions so different from ordinary ones, by comparing the following
two statements:
(1) when the sun rises, the air becomes warmer;
(2) if the pressure of a gas battery increases by so many atmospheres,
its electromotive force increases by so many volts.
Statement (2) is reported by Duhem as an example of an experiment’s
conclusion [Duhem 1991, 148]. Of course (1) can be understood by any
competent speaker of English, whereas understanding (2) requires some
knowledge of physics; yet their cognitive content remains essentially dif-
ferent also for the trained experimenter. Both statements can be tested
under the circumstances they describe, but the (practical) facts referred
to by (1) are recognized on the grounds of everyday perceptual similarity,
while the situation described by (2) can be tested in infinitely different
concrete situations that have hardly anything in common in terms of per-
ceptual properties15. Perceptual similarities are simply sidestepped by
physical conceptualizations. The experimenter in order to control the
validity of (2) may adopt several alternative measurement techniques,
which require different instruments and procedures. The experimental
setting which would be perceptible in the laboratory and the series of
manipulations it would undergo would change completely from case to
case. The interpretation of a physical experiment I previously men-
tioned requires different actions depending on the choice of samples,
instruments and tools and even of the place in which the laboratory is
situated. Without a careful check of these conditions, without a simul-
taneous subsumption of these items under appropriate theoretical types,
the required physical description won’t apply at all to what is actually
seen and touched. However:
(. . . ) all these diverse manipulations, among which the uninitiated would
fail to see any analogy, are not really different experiments; they are only
different forms of the same experiment; the facts which have been really
produced have been as dissimilar as possible, yet the perception of these
facts is expressed by a single proposition: The electromotive force of a
certain battery increases by so many volts when the pressure is increased
by so many atmospheres. [Duhem 1991, 149].
15This is not only true of physico-mathematical descriptions, for there exist other
types of concepts that do not apply to the world in virtue of perceptual similarities
standards. What is however at issue here is a comparison between the language of
mathematical physics and the language used in basic observational reports.
Incommensurability and laboratory science 249
Sentence (1) describes a particular set of facts involving situations
which are identifiable on the basis of perceptual similarity and, more-
over, identifiable independently one from the other. It is not because you
see that the sun is rising that you feel warmer and vice versa. Objects
and processes enter sentence (1) one by one, without mutual definition.
On the contrary, the experimenter cannot say that the pressure has in-
creased by so many atmospheres without holding some beliefs about the
manometer (and about many other things) and, conversely, the failure
of observing expected phenomena might cast doubts on the reliability of
the instruments implemented. New checks may be called for (new prac-
tical facts would take place in the laboratory), new systematic errors
may be taken into account, and the very fact that an instrument was
acting as a manometer, that is, its being an instantiation of an abstract
type of instrument, may be questioned. This example clearly illustrates
a situation that we could describe with the term co-subsumption: the gas
cannot be subsumed under the predicate “having a pressure of x atmo-
spheres” if at the same time the instrument used to determine that the
value of its pressure is x is not subsumed under the predicate “reliable
manometer”.
A concept’s extension can be said to consist of an equivalence class
of individuals. What we have just seen is that physico-mathematical
concepts cannot divide up the world in different classes without a si-
multaneous definition of equivalent classes of experiments allowing their
applications to the world; thus, physical theory does not provide a static
taxonomy of the world, it yields rather an interrelated dual taxonomy of
entities and actions in experimental contexts. In a laboratory physical
entities cannot be classified if a suitable co-classification of the practical
context and of the material items involved does not take place16. Only
in this way can we understand in what sense physical experiments may
be said to be repeatable. As a series of concrete facts each experiment
actually performed is unique and different from any other, but physical
theory provides a complex conceptual unification of these series of facts
under a single abstract and symbolic description. Only at the level of
these abstract descriptions can the methodological condition of repeata-
bility be fulfilled: observable regularities play little if any role at all in
laboratory science17.
16Popper famously said that in the exploration of reality our theories play the role
of new sense organs. I believe this should be said rather of experimental contexts
under a theoretical description. An equivalent class of seemingly different experi-
ments conceptually unified by a theoretical description constitutes an extension of
the cognitive possibilities of our body.
17In an article on the nature of laboratory science, Ian Hacking has maintained
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5. Perceptual taxonomies and physico-mathematical
taxonomies
We have seen that Duhem introduces a distinction between physics and
chemistry on the one hand and more descriptive sciences such as anatomy
and physiology on the other. His holism applies only to the former, while
the latter relate to the world somehow unproblematically, in virtue of
the direct mirroring of external reality provided by naked-eye observa-
tion. There is hardly the need to say that we can no longer accept
such a sharp cleavage. There is no such thing as a purely descriptive
common sense language and the concepts used in ordinary contexts to
classify the objects of perception are always theory-laden. Just as a
physicist cannot leave his theories outside the laboratory when perform-
ing an experiment, a layman cannot utter any judgement about the
world without interpreting what he sees in the light of a given concep-
tual network. Where Duhem saw a sharp discontinuity, more recent
philosophers of science have seen, at best, a continuous range of dif-
ferent degrees of theory-ladenness. This fact is clearly highlighted by
Kuhn’s treatment of meaning change and incommensurable taxonomies,
which is supported by examples taken from episodes scattered through-
out the history of science, regardless of the level of abstraction of the
theories under discussion and of the degree of sophistication of the ex-
perimental techniques involved. Kuhn mentions the shift from Ptolemy’s
to Copernicus’ astronomy on a par with the controversy about phlogis-
ton or the conceptual changes brought about by Planck’s solution to the
black-body problem. He treats all these historical episodes as examples
of how the way language organizes experience can undergo more or less
radical changes. It really seems that language and experience are no less
central to Kuhn’s history-oriented account of knowledge than to the log-
that Duhem’s analysis stresses the role of intellectual elements on the grounds that
it focuses on the interplay of theories and auxiliary hypotheses, thus neglecting the
role of actions and material items [Hacking 1992, 54]. This interpretation is probably
motivated by Duhem’s strong emphasis on the theoretical character of the interpre-
tations necessary for the use of instruments. My reconstruction should show, on the
contrary, that Duhem, although not very explicitly, has taken into account the role
of action and material items in experimenting and testing. Clearly, whatever is per-
ceived or done can in principle be described and, under this description, becomes
part of the host of hypotheses surrounding experimental activities; yet, it remains
true that what Duhem’s hypotheses are also about is actions and material items,
and that he certainly does not treat laboratory devices as “(. . . ) black boxes, as
established devices that generate data which are literally given” [Hacking 1992, 53].
Hacking rightly says that “all action, all doing, all working is under a description”
[Hacking 1993, 277], I would add that there is no better way to summarize Duhem’s
ideas on the matter.
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ical reconstructions of scientific activities developed by his predecessors.
Certainly, letting Duhem’s crude distinctions go by the board allows us
to achieve a more comprehensive perspective on knowledge and to dis-
cuss interesting phenomena such as holism and incommensurability also
outside the domain of mathematical physics. But does this mean that
within a satisfactory account of the way concepts deploy their descriptive
power, laboratory activities shouldn’t nevertheless be granted a different
status with respect to naked-eye observations? Can’t we look instead for
a more fine-grained analysis of the different ways in which scientific con-
cepts apply to the world? It is precisely on these grounds that, I believe,
Duhem can still teach something to Kuhn.
As we have seen, Cartwright has urged that a distinction between ob-
servation and theory is needed. It is worth noticing that, in his answer to
Cartwright, Kuhn accepts that distinction but he adds some important
qualifications:
I agree that the distinction is needed, but it cannot be just that between
the “peculiarly recondite terms [of modern science and] those we are more
used to in our day-to-day life.” Rather, the concepts of theoretical terms
must be relativized to one or another particular theory. Terms are theoret-
ical with respect to a particular theory if they can only be acquired with
that theory’s aid. They are observation terms if they must first have been
acquired elsewhere before the theory can be learned. ‘Force’ is thus theo-
retical with respect to Newtonian dynamics but observational with respect
to electromagnetic theory. [Kuhn 1993, 246].
This passage renders even more apparent how Kuhn’s point of view
is language-centred. A term is theoretical with respect to the theory in
which it is embedded and observational with respect to a (presumably)
more complicated one, in which the term is nevertheless applied as an
antecedently understood one. Clearly what Kuhn has in mind here is,
once more, the language/theory learning process. In that process a pre-
viously understood vocabulary is necessary for learning new scientific
concepts. A term is therefore observational, for Kuhn, if it belongs to
a language, which provides the ground for further theoretical develop-
ments; the main advantage of this account being that it yields a develop-
mental notion of the theory/observation distinction. At a certain stage,
an individual or a community is endowed with some available dictionary,
which of course is theory-laden for it makes sense in the context of the
given language/theory in which it had been previously learned. This
dictionary happens to be the contingent starting point for “further ex-
tension of both vocabulary and knowledge” [Kuhn 1993, 247], but, once
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the process of enlarging theories and dictionary get started, it becomes
observational with respect to some new sets of terms. In short, there is
no static, a-historical distinction between observational and theoretical
terms, no original linguistic starting point, which lays stable foundations
for the edifice of knowledge.
I believe that this solution can be accepted if what we are after is to
understand how language is learned and how terms belonging to succes-
sive theories relate to each other, but it fails to provide an account of
how different types of terms attach to nature. Terms such as “red” or
“wood” on one side and “force” or “electrical resistance” on the other, in
spite of their being all theory-laden in virtue of their embeddedness in a
language, do have an intrinsically different status, for the former can and
normally are applied on the grounds of simple perception, whereas the
latter are concepts whose application requires acts of measurement. No
developmental process, no paradigm shift, no new acquisition of knowl-
edge and vocabulary can efface that difference or swap the roles of the
two families of terms, for that difference is not grounded on language or
theory, but in the different activities needed to apply them to the world.
Indeed perceiving and measuring are essentially different performances
of the knowing subject. To accept this does not imply a vindication of
the duhemian cleavage between the uncontroversial but vague common
sense facts and the precise but hypothetical theoretical facts, nor to resort
to a kind of carnapian divide between the class of theory-free observa-
tional terms and the class of theoretical terms logically connected to the
former via appropriate bridge principles18. I agree that all language is
theory-laden and that also observational reports are fallible and relative
to beliefs held at a certain developmental stage; nevertheless, I insist that
there is a sharp difference in the way in which those terms or descrip-
tions are attached to nature. A term like “quantity of heat” will never be
observational in the way a term like “tree” is and this is the case for any
term or taxonomy that, although not quantitative in itself, requires acts
of measurement for its application19. At a particular historical stage,
we are given a certain contingent conceptual network and we would be
wrong in trying to split its vocabulary into an observational and a the-
18A succinct exposition on Carnap’s ideas on the subject, which also pays attention
to its evolution, can be found in Carnap’s intellectual autobiography (see especially
§ 13), published in [Schilpp 1963]. A comprehensive reconstruction and a critical
appraisal of the debate concerning the theory/observation dichotomy within logical
empiricism can be found in [Parrini 2002].
19Venturing a long way outside the domain of physics, we find that a science like
palaeontology is a source of examples of this kind (that are frequent also in physics,
see section 7).
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oretical part on the basis of a linguistic analysis, whether one (like that
of Carnap) that purports to identify an intrinsic, unchanging distinction
or one (like that of Kuhn) that aims at drawing theory-dependent and
shifting dividing lines. What is needed instead, is an investigation of
the various activities underlying the application of the conceptual terms
(note that application does not reduce to learning but see further on this
point) and an analysis of the intrinsic characteristics of these activities.
The comparison between the sets of terms that must be applied in order
to test sentences (1) and (2) of the previous section respectively should
be interpreted in this way. The common sense taxonomy (or conceptual
cluster):
(a) {sun, sunrise, air, warmth}
is different from the physico-mathematical taxonomy (or conceptual
cluster):
(b) {pressure; electromotive force; increase in pressure by so many at-
mospheres; gas battery; increase in electromotive force by so many
volts; relevant instruments; tools; conditions of the laboratory; ac-
tions of the experimenters; etc.}
because the activities needed to apply the concepts belonging to (a)
amount simply to acts of perception, whereas those involved in the ap-
plication of concepts such as “pressure” and “electromotive force” are, be-
sides perceptions, complicated theory-laden instrumented actions aimed
at measuring physical quantities. Those actions are therefore co-inter-
preted by the physico-mathematical taxonomy, which, for this reason,
deserved to be called dual20. This explains why the concepts belonging
to (a) do not refer to the acts of perceptions, nor to the sense organs
needed to apply them, while in taxonomy (b) the actions and material
items of the experimenter are taken together with the description of the
physical properties and events. Physical theory, as Duhem says, unifies
conceptually experiments that have nothing visible in common beyond
what belongs necessarily to any structured perception of objects and
properties, which implies that the entities physical theory describes are
classified if and only if the experimental contexts that reveal them are
classified in turn.
It might be objected that also the application of observational terms
requires the fulfilment of some conditions concerning the context of the
20All physico-mathematical taxonomies are dual, but the converse needs not be
true.
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application. In order to decide whether what I see is a cat or a small dog,
I need to get sufficiently close to the animal, I must have a well func-
tioning perceptive apparatus, I must not be hallucinating or under the
effect of drugs etc., the objection would then continue that those con-
ditions are omitted from everyday observational reports, even though
they must be fulfilled for the reports to be reliable and to count as
valid applications of terms and descriptions to reality. Does this objec-
tion show that every taxonomy deserves to be called dual? Let us see.
The reason why concepts referring to the act that allows the application
of ordinary observational terms, are normally omitted is precisely that
they would be in most cases identically the same. Observation terms are
defined precisely by their being immediately applicable on the basis of
that particular kind of act, which is unaided, normal perception. Our
ready-for-use dictionary of objects, properties and states of affairs is not
split in different sets in turn linked to specific conditions of application.
In order to recognize everyday objects and their properties some con-
ditions defining normal, reliable perception must be fulfilled and those
conditions somehow contribute to the very meaning of the word “ob-
servation”. Observation terms are, for a given speaker or community,
those which can be readily used on the basis of simple perception. It
is not the case that to the various taxonomies of cutlery, pets, home
tools or road signals there correspond specific sets of concepts defining
the conditions of their applications. What is peculiar to each of these
taxonomies and makes it different from the others consists only in “ob-
jective terms” referring to reality, not in interrelated “act terms” that
define appropriate conditions of application of the former. As we have
seen, the contrary holds for physico-mathematical taxonomies. They
contain “objective parts” composed by descriptive terms purporting to
refer to the world and “experimental parts” which are highly interrelated
to the former via the intermediary of physical theory. Each objective
physico-mathematical conceptual cluster is a semi-dual taxonomy that
demands a specific “experimental counterpart” for its proper application.
It requires, therefore, the definition of a particular set of those “instru-
mented cognitive activities” that we call “experiments”. This is not the
case for observational taxonomies that hence cannot be called dual in a
non-trivial sense.
Let us underline again, in conclusion, that the distinction between
(a) and (b) is non-developmental, just as much as the difference between
bare perceiving through the sense organs and performing instrumented
manipulations in order to apply the language of mathematics to the
external reality. It is true that measurement practices can develop only
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on the grounds of a pre-existing perceptual activity; but this is not the
kind of “developmental character” that Kuhn refers to, and which is at
issue here. According to Kuhn, a term like “electrical resistance” can be
theoretical at a certain developmental stage and become observational
(just like “tree”) at a later one. I argue instead that this is impossible
because of the physico-mathematical character of the concept “electrical
resistance”.
As we shall see, Kuhn’s failure to notice this kind of distinction and
its non-developmental character has repercussions on his description of
the role of paradigmatic examples in the way scientific terms apply to
the world.
6. Textbook problems and experiments
Can we really say that by solving paradigmatic textbook problems stu-
dents learn to relate physical symbolic expressions to reality? In the light
of the preceding considerations, we can say that an affirmative answer
would be rash. A physics problem is still a purely theoretical exercise in
which physical quantities appear as given from the outset. Even when
concrete objects (such as a pendulum) are mentioned, their property are
fully defined in mathematical terms, moreover each problem consists of
the description of a “physical micro-drama” (such as a collision or the tra-
jectory of a ball) which takes place in a world purified by all disturbing
factors, a world reduced to a suitable physical description (see section
3). As Cartwright says (see section 2), “models are a long way from
the world” and we need to step into a laboratory to actually see how to
connect an abstract model (and, indirectly, the physical theory behind
it) to reality. What was immediately given in the textbook suddenly be-
comes the result of painstaking investigations. The physical quantities
are not waiting for us to use them in our calculations; they are to be
found with the aid of some instruments, instruments that are normally
omitted from the description of the problem. Moreover the elimination
of disturbing factors cannot be simply postulated, it must be achieved.
This is why students can often be very talented for solving problems,
and yet feel completely lost in a well-equipped laboratory where they
have a hard time recognizing that what happens before their eyes is the
situation described in the textbook. Kuhn’s account does not focus on
this point. In various occasions he equates learning through problems
with learning in the laboratory, for in both cases, according to him, it
suffices to notice that students are exposed to some exemplars and that
this allows the application of the theory to the real world.
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Sometimes the exemplars discussed by Kuhn include standard mea-
surement instruments such as galvanometers and manometers, but the
analysis of their role does not lead to an acknowledgment of their priv-
ileged function with respect to theoretical learning in the application
of physical language to reality, nor does Kuhn introduce the idea of a
hierarchy of increasingly concrete and quantitatively defined exemplars.
Had he done so, he would have probably paid more attention to the fact
that during an experiment, physico-mathematical terms must be applied
not only to the world, but also, at the same time, to the instrumented
activities of the experimenters. In this way he would have appreciated
the peculiar character of dual taxonomies with respect to perceptual
ones. Similarly, in the Postscript some effort is made to distinguish the
literal sense of the word “seeing” that is involved, for example, in ancient
astronomy, from the “metaphoric” one that Kuhn adopts to account for
complex experimental activities necessitating the use of instruments; but
no satisfactory characterisation of the difference is actually provided. We
can even say that Kuhn’s later insistence of the language-dependence of
theoreticity marks in some way a step backward with respect to some
programmatic statements that can be found in the Postscript and in
the article Second Thoughts on Paradigms [Kuhn 1974, 459-482], [Kuhn
1977, 293-319].
Why is Kuhn so reluctant to focus on the specificity of laboratory
activities? I believe it is because he conflates two different processes:
learning or understanding a scientific term (or theory) and attaching it
to nature. Let us try to clarify this point. Certainly, as Kuhn says, in
order to learn classical mechanics, we need to have in mind some ex-
amples of concrete mechanical systems. Nevertheless, various degrees of
acquaintance with such examples must be distinguished. As Cartwright
has noted (see section 2), we may find a series of increasingly concrete
descriptions of an abstract, physical situation. Eventually, the desire for
concreteness will inevitably lead us into a laboratory, where all the prob-
lems that have been mentioned will be waiting for us. Yet, if what we are
after is only to learn and understand the theory, we can be content with
a description of the physical situation, which occupies an intermediate
position on the concreteness scale. It is at this level that most of the
teaching, learning and communication in physics takes place. Classical
mechanics can be understood without any laboratory session just with
the aid of some more or less defined concrete situations that the teacher
needs only to describe to the students, often in qualitative terms. The
teacher, for example, can easily introduce the main ideas of the theory
of collisions by referring to the well-known example of the billiard. He or
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she can then torment the students with all kinds of textbook problems,
where mathematics will have the predominant role. Lecturing in front
of a real billiard may have some pedagogic effect, but it won’t change
the nature of what is being done, that is, teaching and understanding.
If on the contrary, we wished to test the mathematical predictions of the
theory of collisions with a high degree of accuracy on the very billiard
before us, we would immediately find ourselves lost in a duhemian jun-
gle of instruments, careful checks and auxiliary assumptions. It is only
at this further stage that the mechanical concepts would authentically be
applied to the world and not in the bare linguistic activities in which they
are taught and learned21.
Theoretical physics provides us with other interesting examples. The
Higgs boson is a particle postulated by the standard model of particle
physics, which has not yet been detected. Therefore the concept “Higgs
boson” has never been really applied to nature. Nevertheless, even if
that particle happens to be found, the very event of its identification
won’t add much to the understanding theoretical physicists have of the
standard model.
Could one really maintain that, as long as physicists are not trained
experimenters as well as skilful problem-solvers, they do not really un-
derstand the theory? I suspect that today’s theoreticians who, in the
laboratories where their theory are being tested, often feel very much
like a duhemian layman “ignorant of physics”, would be rather upset by
an affirmative answer.
7. An example of dual taxonomy
In this section I will illustrate the notion of dual taxonomy by means of a
relatively simple example. The conceptual structure of modern physical
theories is often far too complicated to be visualised with the aid of
simple diagrams. As the degree of complexity cannot but increase if the
experimental side is also taken into account, in my example I will only
consider a small fragment of an already fairly robust taxonomy, namely
that of crystalline lattice structures.
Within the class of lattices whose unit cell has a cubic shape, we find
the subclasses of the simple cubic lattices (S.C.), the face-centred cubic
lattices (F.C.C.) and the body-centred cubic lattices (B.C.C.). As it is
well known, there are experimental procedures involving the diffraction
21Authentic application does not imply the adequacy to a mind-independent reality,
but simply the presence of conditions that make possible the application of a term.
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of X-rays that allow the determination of the lattice structure of various
substances as well as the corresponding unit cell dimensions. In general,
a suitably prepared specimen of the crystal under investigation is placed
in a beam of monochromatic X-rays. The resulting diffracted beams
produce a diffraction pattern, which is recorded on a strip of film. The
study of the diffraction pattern provides the required information about
the lattice structure. In the diagram given at the end of the present
paper, the boxes in the vertical column represent the types of cubic
lattices. For simplicity the subsumption of only one element (copper)
under the corresponding type of lattice structured is represented.
The boxes representing objective properties and entities (the objec-
tive parts of the dual taxonomy) are drawn with continuous lines. The
big arrow represents the subsumption of the element copper under the
predicate “having a face-centred cubic lattice”. The subsumption occurs
if and only if an experiment is performed, which belongs to the class of
equivalence of all possible experiments leading to the same conclusion
(conceptually unified by physical theory). This class of equivalence can
in turn be divided in types of experiments, thus giving rise to the ex-
perimental part of the dual taxonomy. A box drawn with dashed lines
within the arrow represents each different type of experiment. We can
imagine that in order to “reach” the box of F.C.C crystals, the element
copper would have to “jump” into one of the boxes contained in the ar-
row. That is: for copper to be subsumed under the predicate “having a
F.C.C. lattice structure”, a sample of copper must be analysed with an
experimental procedure in turn co-subsumed under a type of theoreti-
cally acceptable experiments.
It is certainly true that the specification of the experimental part of
a dual taxonomy is highly problematic. For our purposes an experiment
is defined as the set of all practical and intellectual operations necessary
to achieve the final result from the choice, preparation and use of the
experimental setting to the analysis of the data. There are clearly sev-
eral ways in which the different types of experiments can be defined. In
our example, the choice of the source of X-rays would be considered as
an important discriminating factor and so would be the procedure used
to render the radiation monochromatic and to measure its wavelength.
But, would the kind of film or the method of development adopted be
considered as defining different types experiments or would they sim-
ply determine minor distinctions between subtypes22? As a matter of
22In general such a classification will of course admit a complex branching of types
of experiments into more and more precisely defined subtypes. In the diagram this
hierarchical structure has been omitted for simplicity.
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fact, no experiment can ever be completely described and in general,
no experiment can be the exact repetition of another one: a great deal
of tacit knowledge, of the kind students acquire only by imitating their
teachers, contributes to determine the way an experiment is done and
interpreted. Tacit ceteris paribus clauses intervene to wipe out the un-
manageable number of little details that we deem without effect on the
result. In short, the experimental part of a dual taxonomy is doomed to
remain, up to a certain extent, sketchy and incomplete and some vague-
ness will inevitably affect the boundaries between types and subtypes of
experiments. Difficult though it may be to fully specify taxonomies of
experiments, it remains true that the description of the experiment is
logically necessary for the application of physico-mathematical concepts
to reality.
It must be stressed that, although a predicate such as “having a
F.C.C. lattice structure” is not by itself the result of an act of measure-
ment, it can only be applied if several physical quantities are determined
(the wavelength of the monochromatic beam of X-rays, the exact posi-
tion of the specimen in the camera, etc.). Moreover, as I have already
said, experiments of the kind just described are normally made in order
to determine also the unit cell dimension of the lattices, which can be
derived by the exact position of the reflections constituting the inter-
ference pattern. It would be possible to take into account these further
determinations in the diagram of the dual taxonomy, but at the price of
increasing its complication. Each box in the vertical column would be
split in an enormous number of little boxes corresponding to predicates
of the kind “having a F.C.C. lattice structure with unit cell dimension
4.049 Å”, “having a F.C.C. lattice structure with unit cell dimension 4.056
Å” etc. The number of such predicates would depend on the degree of
precision that our experiments allow us to attain. Aluminium, for in-
stance, would be connected to the little box corresponding to the first
of the just mentioned predicates by an “experimental arrow” containing
the class of equivalence of all experiments whose result is compatible
with the correct value. The reason why, normally, predicates of this
form are not considered “taxonomic” (in the strict sense of the word)
is easy to understand. From a logical point of view there is nothing
wrong in considering a crystal “having a F.C.C. lattice structure with
unit cell dimension 4.049 Å” as a kind of crystal “having a F.C.C. lattice
structure”. However, it is clear that most of the classes corresponding
to such predicates would be empty, for they far outnumber the existing
elements and substances. As taxonomic kinds are normally introduced
to describe in a simple and compact way a multiplicity of individuals,
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the ordinary quantitative determinations we encounter in physics do not
have, in general, a classificatory function in the traditional sense. Yet it
remains true that, in principle, also physico-mathematical values belong
to the taxonomic lexicon of a theory: a force of 3 newton is a kind of
force23. This fact is of crucial importance for understanding the common
features shared by Kuhn’s and Hacking’s versions of incommensurability.
8. The ostensive character of theories
Yet one may think that something has been lost on the way. It may seem
hard to deny that after all, physical concepts can and often are applied to
the world also outside the laboratory. While holding a mug full of boiling
hot coffee, we may say that some quantity of heat is being transmitted
to our hand, and while seeing some sparks on a conductor, we may speak
of electrical currents, electrostatic potentials and of the air’s dielectric
coefficient. Indeed physical theory is often used to explain a huge variety
of phenomena that take place before our eyes. However, different types
of application should be distinguished. Just as learning can proceed
with the aid of some more or less concrete descriptions, the application
of physical theory to actual situations admits degrees of fulfilment24.
A sketchy explanation of an electrical phenomenon in qualitative terms
cannot be equated with the precise quantitative determination of it that
can take place in a laboratory. Physics can be taught in classrooms
and used to formulate sketchy explanations or qualitative predictions
in the “open air”; but it can be properly tested only through careful
experiments.
Having said this, it must be added that the analysis of this problem
can be satisfactorily carried out only by taking into consideration the
role played by ostension in physics.
Especially in his later works, Kuhn’s analyses of the function of ex-
emplars in theory learning have heavily relied on the role of ostension.
He takes ostension to be a procedure by which a particular object or
situation is exhibited in order to explain the domain of applicability of
a concept, without intending it as a radically pre-linguistic activity that
would enable us to point at objects before any conceptual vocabulary is
available (an antecedently understood vocabulary is, according to him,
a necessary condition of theory-learning). The exhibits or exemplars
23From a logical point of view quantitative determinations are taxonomic in char-
acter in the strict sense defined by the “kind of” relation. Hence they belong a fortiori
to the more loosely defined taxonomies that are at issue in this article.
24The term is borrowed, with some licence, from husserlian phenomenology.
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have precisely the function of defining the similarity standards the stu-
dents must acquire. This explains why a single ostensive episode never
suffices to make out the meaning of a concept25 and why ostension is
always in some sense theory-laden: Ptolemy would point at the sun and
at Jupiter in various occasions, he would remark their changing posi-
tions in the sky and would thus illustrate his concept of planet; Volta
would draw or build a battery and then point at want he took to be an
electric cell, etc.26. Kuhn’s analysis is again both interesting and con-
vincing but it has the already mentioned shortcoming of treating on an
equal footing examples of conceptual changes occurred from the time of
ancient astronomy to contemporary mathematical physics. Actually, he
intends to give a language-based account of the meaning of kind terms
in general where the conceptual couple cat/dog is mentioned along with
conductor/insulator and planet/satellite. On the contrary, if the role of
ostension is to be clarified, some attention must be paid to the different
categories of objects and properties a given theory is about.
Ancient astronomy for instance, is a theory of a very peculiar char-
acter for it refers to the behaviour of a particular set of visible objects:
the celestial bodies. From the point of view of modern science, Ptolemy
didn’t really develop a general theory, but an ad hoc model of a sin-
gle complex system whose elements are identifiable through naked-eye
observations (however complex they might be).
The decisive turning point didn’t come with Copernicus but with
Newton. It is only in the framework of classical mechanics that the
solar system itself is replaced by an ensemble of mutually interacting
masses whose behaviour is described by abstract laws. The resulting
taxonomy is already physico-mathematical and, hence, dual. From the
point of view of the domain of the theory, the change could not be more
radical. The theory of gravitation is about the behaviour of masses,
whether in the sky or elsewhere, and the very existence of the solar
system (and even that of the fixed stars) is irrelevant to its validity. As
long as we can identify objects endowed with mass, Newton’s theory
will be applicable. Clearly then, the role of ostension must have been
consequently modified and the duality of the taxonomy will play an
important role in the identification of relevant empirical situations. A
concept that applies to direct visible objects, like “planet” for Ptolemy,
is certainly more easily definable by means of ostensive procedures than
25Actually no finite set of ostensive episodes can suffice for the purpose. Meanings
are always, in a sense, unfinished.
26Kuhn also mentions the importance of examples taken from the contrast set of
concepts.
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the abstract and mathematical notion of “mass”. That is why complex
exemplars are needed involving measurement instruments [Kuhn 1989,
66-74].
The theories developed along the history of science have generally
become more and more abstract and mathematical, thus determining a
growing role for dual experimental taxonomies with decreasing ostensive
character. Newton’s theory, or the theory of heat have still a phenomenal
side that we could call in a loose way ostensive, for they refer to classes
of objects or facts that belong also to common sense knowledge. With
electromagnetism, this ostensive character has become even weaker. Fi-
nally, Twentieth Century particle physics has produced theories that do
not refer directly in any way to something that can be observed. Their
dictionary does not contain any term that belongs to common sense
knowledge nor that is easily related to it. With respect to them, even
Newtonian talk about masses seems after all to be referring to something
open to our gaze. We cannot point at an object or event and be sure
that what we are seeing has something to do with the predictions of the
standard model of particle physics, for it is only background knowledge
that can tell us if and when a pattern of observable facts embodies a
model of the theory. The price to be paid for enriching our knowledge
with extremely abstract and general theories lies in their remoteness
from every-day observation.
Let us go back to the problem of the application of theoretical de-
scriptions outside the laboratory. The idea is the following: the more a
theory is endowed with ostensive character, the more it can be applied,
although often in a loose and qualitative way, outside an experimental
context. As science progresses, the role of ostension decreases and the
gap between learning/understanding/theorizing on one side and exper-
imenting on the other becomes bigger. Kuhn’s exemplars usually refer
to stages of the history of science during which that gap is not yet so
dramatic as to render this fact evident.
Kuhn himself, in an article on the function of measurement in physics,
situates a second scientific revolution between 1800 and 1850, at the time
in which physics became fully mathematical [Kuhn 1961, 220]. Duhem
writes after that revolution and has clearly understood some of his most
relevant epistemological consequences.
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9. Conclusion: Incommensurability and laboratory
science
Let us reconsider the notion of incommensurability in the light of the
preceding considerations. A passage of Kuhn describing the changes
that taxonomies undergo during scientific revolutions will serve as the
starting point of the discussion:
When such a redistribution of objects among similarity sets occurs, two
men whose discourse had proceeded for some time with apparently full un-
derstanding may suddenly find themselves responding to the same stimulus
with incompatible descriptions or generalisations. Just because neither can
then say, “I use the word ‘element’ (or ‘mixture’, or ‘planet’, or ‘uncon-
strained motion’) in ways governed by such and such criteria,” the source
of the breakdown in their communication may be extraordinarily difficult
to isolate and bypass. [Kuhn 1970b, 173] (emphasis added).
Here again we find examples taken from different theories, regardless
of the stage of the history of science to which they belong. This is not,
however, what I intend to stress. Rather, I would like to focus on the
fact that Kuhn treats incommensurable taxonomies as conceptual net-
works that cut up differently a common fund of sensory stimulations.
The analysis carried out in this paper shows that this account of incom-
mensurability can be applied to the shift from Ptolemaic to Copernican
astronomy, or to other episodes involving theories with a strong osten-
sive character (section 8), but it need not be the correct account of
incommensurability in laboratory science. Certainly, also in sophisti-
cated mathematized sciences, it may happen that scientists belonging
to rival schools are led to describe the same observable situation with
different concepts, but this will rather be the exception than the rule.
As we have seen, in a highly developed laboratory science, what is really
observed during an experiment is replaceable in virtue of physical theory
with items that have hardly anything visible in common (section 3). Dif-
ferent experimental settings and procedures are conceptually unified at
a theoretical level by a dual taxonomy (section 4). Therefore two rival
schools of physicists may accept different dual taxonomies that define
distinct classes of equivalence of experimental settings and procedures.
In this case the experimenters belonging to the two schools would not
be exposed to the same stimulations, for their experiments would look
different also to the layman “ignorant of physics”. Incommensurability
would take a different and more radical form.
It might be objected that after all, the adherents of one school could
in principle step into the laboratories belonging to the other and try
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to understand and describe what happens there in the language of their
theory and vice versa. In this case, it might seem that the situation would
again be that envisaged by Kuhn: a common fund of sensory stimulations
(in this case, those relative to the two sets of laboratory items) are
interpreted in a different way in the light of two rival paradigms. It would
seem that we could therefore hold on to the kuhnian idea that radical
scientific change can be characterised, also in the case of laboratory
science, as a change in the way language organizes experience.
The answer to this objection can be given by taking into account the
peculiar structure of dual taxonomies. As we have seen (sections 5 and
7), a dual taxonomy has an objective and an experimental part. Now, as
the diagram of section 7 intuitively illustrates with the graphic differenti-
ation between static and dynamic classificatory arrays, what is classified
by these two different parts has a specific logical and ontological status.
The experiments are not elements or parts of the one world that both
schools of physicists seek to understand, in the way objects, properties
and processes classified by the objective part of a dual taxonomy are pur-
ported to be. They are not natural phenomena “to be saved”, belonging
to the explanandum of all rival theories whose adherents strive to render
complete. Certainly, any experiment has a material or phenomenal side
that demands an explanation of some kind, but, as we have seen, its
cognitive relevance for a given theory is dependent upon the theoretical
interpretation that the experimenter attributes to it. After observing
the experiments that are performed by a rival school of physicists, one
could simply be led to consider them as theoretically irrelevant for the
actual controversy or even to disqualify them as valid experiments. For
instance, disagreement over the shielding of the laboratory, the calibra-
tion of the instruments, the treatment of the noise in the analysis of data
can determine different views about what counts as a valid experiment
and what counts instead as a meaningless series of manipulations.
In his last works Kuhn does not seem to stress the role of sensory
stimulations. Hopefully this is due to a gradual departure from the nat-
uralism that lurks behind his epistemology. However, reference to stim-
ulations is unnecessary for his account of incommensurability and for
the objections to it that have just been presented. Two contemporary
rival theories with a strong ostensive character certainly share a basic
vocabulary that can play the epistemological role of “the same stimulus”
mentioned in Kuhn’s last quotation. This shared vocabulary can pro-
vide the ground for the comparative assessment of the two theories27.
27See [Soler 2003] where it is underlined that, if the rival theories in question
are not contemporary, the “common observational vocabulary” belongs to a meta-
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As the ostensive character decreases, the basic vocabulary available for
comparison becomes thinner or even empty and the sharing of measure-
ment instruments and procedures will instead play the predominant role
in the comparison.
The extreme situation in which two rival theories are supported by
disjoint sets of measurement procedures is precisely that described by
Hacking and named “literal incommensurability”. Hacking, as we have
seen (section 1), treats separately this kind of incommensurability from
the one that concerns the relation between taxonomies pertaining to rival
theories. The aim of my analysis has been to show that these two kinds
of incommensurability can be accommodated in an enlarged taxonomic
formulation that takes into account the competing roles of ostension and
dual taxonomies in the way theories refer to the world. The central idea
of this enlarged taxonomic version can now be introduced:
Incommensurability results, in general, from a deep transformation
of the taxonomy pertaining to a theory, where the term “taxonomy” can
refer both to dual taxonomies and to more descriptive ones. In the case
of laboratory science, this transformation implies the replacement of a
dual taxonomy with a new, incompatible one28.
The classical example of lexical incommensurability provided by
Ptolemy’s and Copernicus’ astronomies and the examples of literal in-
commensurability proposed by Hacking and Pickering refer to theories
that are extreme, opposite cases within an ideal classification of theories
with respect to the strength of their ostensive character and the inversely
proportional duality of their taxonomies: the difference between the two
apparently incompatible types of incommensurability is only one of de-
gree. The experimental part of the taxonomy pertaining to descriptive
sciences is often almost trivial, whereas that of contemporary physics is
hypertrophic29. Once reconsidered in this way, therefore, also Hacking’s
literal incommensurability can be seen as a case of taxonomic incom-
mensurability. The situation he envisages is one in which successive
theories differ radically not only with respect to the objective part of
their dual taxonomies, but also with respect to the experimental part.
The objective part would consist of physico-mathematical predicates: ei-
language developed by the historian of science, a meta-language that is not theoretical
with respect to the incompatible assumptions of the two theories. The common
observational sentences thus introduced need not have actually been uttered by the
adherents of the two paradigms.
28In what way the degree of incompatibility of two dual taxonomies should be
evaluated is a problem that I will not discuss here.
29This is, I believe, the way in which Duhem’s distinction between different types
of sciences should be rephrased.
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ther physico-mathematical values, or predicates applicable only on the
basis of measurement acts. The experimental part would instead consist
of types of laboratory practices and measurement procedures ordered in
equivalent classes allowing the application to reality of the correspond-
ing elements of the objective part. Note that considering the results of
measurements as descriptive predicates belonging to the objective part
of the dual taxonomy is essential to this taxonomic reformulation of lit-
eral incommensurability (see end of section 7): measurement procedures
are conceptualizing procedures. Finally, let us not lose sight of the fact
that Hacking has considered an extreme situation. Less dramatic cases,
in which two competing theories share some elements of the objective
and of the experimental part of their dual taxonomies are more likely to
occur.
Kuhn has often urged that:
(. . . ) men who hold incommensurable viewpoints be thought of as members
of different language communities and that their communication problems
be analyzed as problems of translation. [Kuhn 1970b, 175].
In the light of the preceding analysis, it can be maintained, I believe,
that this account of incommensurability is too narrow. A scientific com-
munity cannot be seen, in general, simply as a language community; it
must be characterised also in terms of the kinds of experimental contexts
and practices through which its theories are applied to the world. After
a scientific revolution, scientists do not just “tell a different story” about
the world, they also modify their experimental practices and develop
new technical and conceptual means for interacting with reality: mod-
ern science is a cognitive enterprise to which both language and practice
are essential30. It is with respect to the complex interplay of these two
elements that a role for the problematic of translation in the discussion
of radical scientific change still needs to be found.
30Sometimes Kuhn acknowledges the crucial role of technical means in the medi-
ation between reality and theory (see, for instance, [Kuhn 1993, 246]) and Hacking
underlines that he intended to give an account also of kinds of instruments and ex-
periments [Hacking 2003, 390]. It is a pity that these insights should have never been
consistently integrated into his account of the nature of incommensurability.
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